IAEA Safeguards System

The IAEA safeguards system uses technical measures to check that nuclear material and activities declared for peaceful purposes are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It works through legally binding safeguards agreements between a state and the International Atomic Energy Agency, combining state declarations, inspections, measurement and information analysis.

Legal framework and coverage

The scope of verification depends on the safeguards agreement concluded by the state with the IAEA.

• Under comprehensive safeguards agreements, generally concluded pursuant to Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, safeguards apply to all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities within the state.
• Item-specific safeguards agreements cover only the nuclear material, facilities or equipment specified in the agreement.
• Voluntary-offer agreements allow the five NPT nuclear-weapon states to offer selected nuclear material and facilities for safeguards.
• An Additional Protocol gives the IAEA broader information and access, strengthening its capacity to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Verification process

Verification compares a state's declarations with evidence independently collected and analysed by the IAEA.

• States submit information on nuclear material inventories, transfers, facilities and relevant activities, while operators maintain nuclear material accountancy records.
• IAEA inspectors examine records, verify facility design information, conduct physical inventory checks and independently measure nuclear material.
• Containment and surveillance measures, including seals, cameras and monitoring systems, help preserve continuity of knowledge between inspections.
• Environmental sampling and analysis of satellite imagery, trade information and other relevant sources help identify inconsistencies or possible undeclared activities.

Safeguards conclusions and limits

The IAEA evaluates all available information and reports annual safeguards conclusions for each state. A broader conclusion that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities requires sufficient verification regarding both declared material and the absence of undeclared material and activities.

• Safeguards provide credible assurance of non-diversion; they do not themselves regulate nuclear safety, physical security or nuclear disarmament.
• If verification reveals serious concerns, the matter may be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors under the Agency's legal framework.