Shreya Singhal Case and Intermediary Takedowns

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court protected online intermediaries from having to decide the legality of content merely upon private complaints. It read down Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, thereby narrowing when an intermediary must remove or disable access to third-party content to retain safe-harbour protection.

Section 79 and the problem of actual knowledge

Section 79 grants conditional immunity to intermediaries for third-party information hosted or transmitted by them, provided they satisfy statutory requirements such as due diligence. Section 79(3)(b) withdraws this protection if an intermediary, after obtaining actual knowledge of unlawful use of its resource, fails to act expeditiously.

• A broad interpretation would have required intermediaries to judge the legality of content whenever they received a private takedown request.
• The Court found that leaving such decisions to intermediaries could cause excessive removal of lawful speech and undermine Article 19(1)(a).

The Court's reading down of takedown duties

The Court held that actual knowledge under Section 79(3)(b) arises only when an intermediary receives a court order or a notification from the appropriate government or its authorised agency. The order or notification must concern unlawful content relatable to the restrictions permitted by Article 19(2).

• A private complaint by itself does not trigger the judicially defined takedown obligation under Section 79(3)(b).
• After receiving a valid court order or government notification, the intermediary must expeditiously remove or disable access to the specified material to preserve safe harbour.
• The Court similarly read down Rule 3(4) of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, so that it operated consistently with this interpretation.

Constitutional significance

The ruling shifted the initial legal determination from private platforms to courts and authorised public authorities. This reduced incentives for precautionary censorship while preserving takedowns through constitutionally bounded procedures.

• The judgment linked intermediary liability with the closed grounds for restricting speech under Article 19(2).
• In the same decision, the Court struck down Section 66A, but upheld Section 79 subject to the limiting interpretation described above.