Shreya Singhal and the Vagueness Doctrine

The vagueness doctrine requires a law restricting speech to state the prohibited conduct with sufficient clarity. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court held that vague and subjective expressions can chill lawful speech and permit arbitrary enforcement. Such restrictions cannot survive merely because the State may apply them reasonably in practice.

The constitutional holding

The Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 because its restrictions on online speech violated Article 19(1)(a) and were not saved by Article 19(2). Expressions such as "grossly offensive", "annoyance" and "inconvenience" lacked clear legal standards.

What the vagueness doctrine requires

A speech restriction must enable an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited and must provide definite standards for enforcement. An impermissibly vague law produces two connected harms: it gives authorities uncanalised discretion, and its uncertainty creates a chilling effect, causing people to avoid even constitutionally protected expression.

• The possibility of reasonable administration cannot cure a provision whose language is itself vague and overbroad.
• The broader and more uncertain the prohibition, the greater the risk that innocent or protected speech will fall within it.

Protected speech and permissible restriction

The judgment distinguished discussion, advocacy and incitement. Discussion and advocacy remain central to free speech, while restrictions must have a proximate connection with one of the specifically enumerated grounds in Article 19(2), rather than rest on subjective displeasure or speculative harm.