IAEA Additional Protocol

The IAEA Additional Protocol is a legally binding instrument, once in force, that supplements a state's safeguards agreement by providing the IAEA with additional information and access. While a comprehensive safeguards agreement focuses mainly on verifying declared nuclear material, the Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. It thus supports verification of both the correctness and completeness of state declarations.

Why additional verification is needed

A comprehensive safeguards agreement requires a state to declare all nuclear material in peaceful activities and allows the IAEA to verify that it is not diverted. However, verification based mainly on declared material and facilities provides limited assurance about activities that a state has not declared.

• The Additional Protocol broadens verification from accounting for declared material to evaluating the state's entire nuclear fuel cycle.
• It enables the IAEA to investigate inconsistencies, gaps or questions arising from declarations and other safeguards information.

Expanded information and access

• States must provide information on nuclear fuel-cycle research and development, uranium mining, specified manufacturing activities and long-term nuclear development plans.
• Reporting extends to exports and imports of specified nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of the Model Protocol.
• The IAEA receives complementary access to specified locations, including sites and other declared locations, to verify information or resolve inconsistencies.
• Inspectors may use location-specific environmental sampling, which can reveal traces of nuclear material associated with undeclared activities.
• Managed-access arrangements protect classified, commercially sensitive or proliferation-sensitive information without preventing effective verification.

Legal effect and verification outcome

The model text is INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. A protocol must be concluded with the state and enter into force; it supplements rather than replaces the underlying safeguards agreement.

• Where the IAEA finds neither diversion of declared material nor indications of undeclared material or activities, it may draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
• This conclusion permits integrated safeguards, combining measures under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol more effectively.

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