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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

SyllabusEffect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests

International RelationsPublished 30 September 2026

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015 was an agreement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 under which Iran accepted verifiable limits on its nuclear programme in return for nuclear-related sanctions relief. Its restrictions sought to lengthen the time needed to produce fissile material and to ensure that Iran's programme remained exclusively peaceful.

Limits on uranium enrichment

  • For 15 years, Iran could enrich uranium only up to 3.67 per cent and retain no more than 300 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched to that level, or its equivalent in other chemical forms.
  • For 10 years, enrichment capacity at Natanz was limited to 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges; advanced-centrifuge research was restricted and phased.
  • For 15 years, Natanz was to remain Iran's only uranium-enrichment facility. Fordow could not enrich uranium or hold nuclear material and was to be converted into a nuclear, physics and technology centre.

Limits on plutonium and weapon-related pathways

  • The Arak heavy-water reactor was to be redesigned so that it would not produce weapons-grade plutonium in normal operation; its original core was to be rendered unusable.
  • For 15 years, Iran could not reprocess spent fuel, conduct reprocessing research or build additional heavy-water reactors; its heavy-water stock was limited to 130 metric tonnes.
  • Iran committed not to undertake specified activities that could contribute to the design or development of a nuclear explosive device.

Verification and monitoring

Compliance was placed under extensive International Atomic Energy Agency verification, including comprehensive safeguards, provisional application of the Additional Protocol and implementation of modified Code 3.1.

  • The IAEA could monitor uranium ore concentrate for 25 years and key centrifuge components for 20 years, while enrichment facilities remained subject to continuing safeguards and surveillance.
  • A defined access and dispute-resolution process applied when the IAEA sought clarification concerning suspected undeclared nuclear activities or materials.

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